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Transforming the Holy City
From Communal Clashes to Urban Violence, 
the Nebi Musa Riots in 1920
ROBERTO MAZZA
Led by General Allenby, British troops entered Jerusalem in December 
1917, ending Ottoman rule and opening a new and crucial era in the 
history of Jerusalem and Palestine. Th e history of Jerusalem has tradi-
tionally been depicted as the quintessential history of confl ict and strife, 
of ethnic and communal tensions and of incompatible national narra-
tives and visions. Th e transition from Ottoman to British rule marked a 
dramatic and radical change in the history of the city, often described as 
the beginning of a period of great transformation. Looking at the riots 
that took place in the city in April 1920, this chapter will explore the 
emergence of structured urban violence in Jerusalem and the ways it 
superseded communal violence. Th e context is provided by the political 
framework set by the British with the Balfour Declaration, the large-
scale arrival of Zionists in Palestine and the reshaping of the urban fab-
ric of Jerusalem.1
Th is chapter will fi rst discuss some general defi nitions of communal 
and structured violence. Th ese two types of violence are not necessarily 
distinct categories, but defi ne diff erent ways of understanding violence 
and its use. I will advance the idea that violence during the Nebi Musa 
riots became in some way elaborated and was no longer spontaneous. 
Arab political leaders used the Nebi Musa celebrations as an ideal time 
to test the degree of Arab resentment and to test violence as a political 
tool. Without suggesting a radical breakaway from the communal nature 
of early episodes of violence that occurred in Jerusalem, the rioting was 
no longer the spontaneous reaction of a population fearful of losing their 
land. Th is transformation is apparent when comparing the Nebi Musa 
riots with earlier violent events such as the intra-communal incidents 
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between Christians in 1901 and the 1911 aff air over the archaeologi-
cal excavations close to the Haram al-Sharif.2 Secondly, this chapter will 
provide a general background on the British Military Administration 
and the politicization of emerging nationalist movements in Palestine. 
It will argue that the transition from communal violence to structured 
violence was the result of the combination of a variety of factors: the ar-
rival of the British, the establishment of the Zionist Commission and the 
spread of Palestinian nationalism. A separate section will show how the 
changes in the urban landscape, implemented by the British governor 
Ronald Storrs, played a major role in renegotiating the urban space of 
Jerusalem and in the radicalization of local politics through policies of 
confessionalization and segregation that eventually created the frame-
work for the development of structured urban violence.
An account of the Nebi Musa riots, discussed in the last part of this 
chapter, will illustrate the shift from communal to structured violence 
with a focus on the importance of the new political conditions engen-
dered by British rule.
Defi nitions
In late Ottoman Jerusalem, violence was common, but not in an orga-
nized form, and its expression was milder than in other areas of the Ot-
toman Empire. As we delve into a brief defi nition of key terms such as 
violence, communalism and urban violence, it is arguable that violence 
is generally associated with the destruction of life, the material world 
and meaning.3 One point should be clarifi ed in relation to the concept 
of violence: particularly to the Western mind, and without being too 
simplistic, ‘violence’ strongly connotes behaviour that in some sense is 
illegitimate or unacceptable.4 However, I would argue that violence in 
Jerusalem was not an arbitrary expression of uncontrollable anger. It 
was rather used as a means of socio-political advancement; judgement 
on violent behaviour is therefore irrelevant in the development of this 
chapter.
As for ‘communalism’, defi ned as the competition between groups 
within the same political systems based on ethnic, linguistic, racial or 
religious identities, it is important to stress that although Jerusalem 
at the beginning of the twentieth century was a city divided along re-
ligious lines, it was not a confessionalized city. Urban space was not 
entirely divided in accordance with religion, and shared spaces were a 
common feature of late Ottoman Jerusalem, as a variety of sources sug-
gest.5 Whereas the years between 1856 and 1860 were characterized by a 
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complete rift between Muslims and Christians throughout much of 
Syria and Palestine (as a result of the promulgation of the 1856 Hatt-i 
Humayun, which promised full equality regardless of religion for the 
citizens of the Ottoman Empire), Jerusalem proved to be a signifi cant 
exception until the arrival of the British in 1917.6 No major disturbances, 
whether organized or spontaneous, occurred in Jerusalem in the second 
part of the nineteenth century.7 With the exception of the 1911 Haram 
al-Sharif incident over the alleged Christian violation of the shrine fol-
lowing archaeological excavations, the most common outbreaks of vio-
lence occurred mainly among Christians themselves over the control of 
holy places.8 A good example is an incident involving Greek Orthodox 
and Franciscans on 4 November 1901, when, following a quarrel be-
tween a number of monks, the two communities became fully involved. 
Two dozen people were killed and many others were injured.9
Violent episodes involving individual members of diff erent commu-
nities were indeed frequent in Jerusalem, but it seems that a number of 
factors prevented the outbreak of major communal violence. Looking at 
the socio-political confi guration of Jerusalem, it is possible to say that 
the presence of a high-ranking Ottoman governor answering directly 
to Istanbul, and of foreigners and foreign consuls – a modernization 
process initiated by the Ottomans that marked the shift of the Jerusa-
lemites from subjects to citizens – as well as the political organization 
of urban politics around a few notable families, all worked towards the 
prevention of communal violence and in a sense towards the partial in-
tegration of local communities.10 Overall, confl icts or potential clashes 
were partly mediated through the socio-political structure of the city 
and partly controlled by the Ottoman establishment and the threat of 
foreign intervention. To this extent, communal violence in Jerusalem 
was clearly far from being organized, but at the same time it was not 
exclusively the outcome of irrational behaviour; it was more the tipping 
point of strained relations between communities.
Th e last term that needs to be clarifi ed is ‘structured violence’, defi ned 
as the performance of violence following a script and rituals within a 
recognized arena, and I would suggest it represents the bridge between 
communalism and fully organized violence.11 Structured violence, as de-
veloped in Jerusalem, displayed political aims propagated by the rheto-
ric of political empowerment and led by self-appointed leaders whose 
purpose was to set the stage for a large, organized political struggle. As 
argued earlier, the historical shift that occurred after the arrival of the 
British in 1917 led to coordinated eff orts by both Zionists and Arabs to 
destroy one or more parties involved in the dispute. Evidence suggests 
that the organization of group mobilization in violent events became 
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very visible in the spring of 1920. Without suggesting a full prearranged 
set of measures to adopt at a certain time in a certain place, the shift 
from communalism to structured violence occurred at the exact mo-
ment when infl icting damage on an enemy became in some way calcu-
lated, as we will see later through the discussion of the riots.
Th e British in Jerusalem
In December 1917, the focal point of the transition from Ottoman to 
British rule of Jerusalem was the military occupation of the city by British 
troops. Th e conquest of Jerusalem and Palestine proved to be a diffi  cult 
task; the British attempted to take Gaza twice and only when General 
Allenby was off ered the command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force 
did things change. In April 1917, the Palestine campaign entered a new 
phase, which led eventually to the capture of Jerusalem.12 A heated de-
bate broke out in London over the occupation of Jerusalem; three weeks 
before the actual occupation, the War Offi  ce eventually formalized the 
main policies to be adopted.13 Th is note already makes it clear that the 
British had scanty knowledge of the mechanisms regulating the urban 
life of Jerusalem. Internal security was to be the primary task of the new 
occupying force; non-Muslims would not be permitted to pass the cor-
don established around the Mosque of Omar.14
On 7 December, despite the cold and heavy rain, everything on the 
British side was ready for the assault on Jerusalem, which was sur-
rounded. On the following day, the Ottomans began to withdraw from 
the city; the Ottoman governor and the German and Austrian consuls 
fl ed during the night.15 No fi ght took place inside the city, and by 9 De-
cember Jerusalem was free of Ottoman and German troops. Th e occu-
pation of the city then became a powerful political tool to be exploited. 
General Allenby made his formal entry into Jerusalem on 11 December, 
following plans that had been carefully devised by Mark Sykes. Allenby 
entered the city through the Jaff a Gate on foot, followed by a procession 
of British military offi  cials and two small Italian and French contingents. 
He then read the proclamation of martial law and promised religious 
freedom. Jerusalemites were generally happy, if not about the arrival of 
the British then indeed about the end of the war.16 However, this reality 
would soon change as local residents realized that the new rulers were 
to ‘muddy the clear waters’ of intercommunal relations.17
With Allenby’s entrance into the city, military rule was offi  cially es-
tablished. Th e fi rst governor of Jerusalem, General Bill Borton, set up 
the administration following the principle of the status quo ante bellum, 
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which regulated the military administration of occupied territories.18 
Th e governorship of Borton lasted a few weeks, and Ronald Storrs, for-
mer oriental secretary in Cairo, was appointed in early 1918 as the new 
governor of Jerusalem.19 Although specifi c plans were yet to be drawn 
up by the military administration and the Foreign Offi  ce in London, this 
appointment proved to be crucial in the social, political, religious, eco-
nomic, urban and architectural development of the city. I will later argue 
that the British, mainly through Ronald Storrs, also contributed to the 
creation of the conditions that allowed violence to become a common 
political tool.
Th e fi rst task of Storrs and the military administration was to cope 
with the general lack of food, medicine and fuel; in other words, they 
had to cater to the needs of the army and most importantly to those of 
the civilian population. Slowly, commerce, trade, bureaucracy, schools 
and legal courts were also re-established. Th e military was not supposed 
to deal with political issues, but in the end, despite decisions made in 
London, the military had to deal with local politics, as it was charged 
with enforcing the status quo. Th e Zionist Commission, representing 
the Zionist Organization and in charge of the application of the Bal-
four Declaration and the emergence of Christian–Muslim associations 
as part of the developing Palestinian national movement, reshuffl  ed and 
redesigned the role of the military rule. I would argue that what was sup-
posed to be temporary lasted for several years, as the future of Jerusalem 
and Palestine was yet to be decided.
In this context, the British relied in local matters on local notables de 
facto perpetuating the same ‘politics of notables’ implemented by the 
Ottomans. Early in 1918, Ronald Storrs appointed the most prominent 
member of the Husayni family, Musa Kazim, Mayor of Jerusalem. He 
was a political activist who, once in charge of the mayoral offi  ce, was 
initially tactful in his opposition to the British and Zionism; however, as 
we shall see later, he was dismissed after he played a major role in the 
Nebi Musa riots.20 Th e leaders of local notable families were not only 
able to maintain their power once the British arrived, they increased it 
while becoming the leaders of the anti-Zionist movement that in this 
particular period took the form of the Christian–Muslim Associations.21
Th e arrival of the British, the establishment of the Zionist Commis-
sion, the spread of Palestinian nationalism and the politicization of the 
local elites were all signs that a paradigm shift was ready to take place, 
one that included violence as a political tool available to the parties in-
volved. Th e British and the introduction of organized violence redefi ned 
urban space, too. Jerusalem was turned from a space for the develop-
ment of citizenship into a sacred place.
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Planning Jerusalem
Th e renegotiation of the urban space of Jerusalem, which then led to 
the radicalization of local politics and the introduction of structured 
violence, occurred mainly through the British governor Ronald Storrs 
and the civic advisor Charles Ashbee.22 Both employed urban planning 
in an eff ort to control newly acquired territory and to satisfy personal 
desires. Ronald Storrs trained in classical studies at Pembroke Col-
lege, Cambridge, also studied languages and was quite fl uent in Arabic, 
knowledge that he used to be appointed to the Egyptian Civil Service 
and then to become oriental secretary to the British Agency in Cairo.23 
Full of himself, and imbued with never-ending self-esteem, Storrs, while 
appointed civil governor of Jerusalem in 1920, claimed to rule Jerusalem 
district like his ‘predecessor’ Pontius Pilate.24 He imagined himself as an 
all-powerful governor in charge of every aspect of urban development, 
life and governance. Storrs believed that his tastes and ideas about ur-
ban space would have a benevolent impact on Jerusalemites. He une-
quivocally intertwined imperial interests with his personal views in his 
style of government. Aesthetics, a very high civic and religious sense, 
and a feeling that the communities of the city should be involved, all led 
Storrs towards the creation of the Pro-Jerusalem Society in 1918. Th e 
society was composed of the mayor of Jerusalem, the consular corps, 
the heads of the Christian denominations and other leading members of 
the British, Arab and Jewish communities. According to its statute, the 
main purpose of the Pro-Jerusalem Society was the preservation and ad-
vancement of the interests of Jerusalem: the provision and maintenance 
of parks, gardens and open spaces and the establishment of libraries, 
museums, music centres and theatres.25 With an emphasis on preserving 
religious antiquities, the society promoted the communitarian notion 
that Jerusalem was a city of three faiths, rather than a space for equal 
citizenship. Th e very logo of the society was a religious symbol repre-
senting the Cross, the Star of David and the Crescent Moon.
Th e members of the society gathered on a regular basis between 
1918 and 1924; however, it is clear that Storrs and Ashbee played the 
leading role.26 Some of the most dramatic reforms implemented by the 
British under the aegis of Storrs were the renaming of the streets, as 
studied by Yair Wallach, and the confessionalization of the quarters in 
the Old City.27 Wallach has noted that two-thirds of the names for the 
new city commemorated prophets, saints, scholars and kings; a third 
of the names were biblical; and the rest included names of crusader 
kings, Christian emperors, Muslim sultans and one Arab medieval 
scholar. Only one woman was commemorated – the crusader Queen 
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Melissanda. Th e names chosen made the streets of ‘new’ Jerusalem look 
ancient. Jerusalemites were reminded on every corner that they were 
walking the biblical city of the prophets, Jesus and Saint Paul. Names 
were not linked to British history, because Storrs chose to link street 
names to the history of Jerusalem, perhaps in an attempt to achieve 
some sort of sectarian harmony. Th is historical pathos was a new fea-
ture in Jerusalem and contrasted with the late Ottoman geographical 
division of the city. Jerusalemites called streets by various names that 
emphasized local characteristics, buildings or local residents. Storrs 
was radically changing this tradition and, in a manner of speaking, was 
dressing Jerusalem in biblical clothes. Not surprisingly, Ronald Storrs 
projected his own British and Victorian ideals in order to preserve the 
‘celestial’ character of the city. He prohibited commercial advertisement 
close to the Old City, and brothels were forbidden within the walls; the 
sale and consumption of alcohol was regulated.28 Religion as a marker 
of national identity was artifi cially enhanced and became the principle 
the British used to divide the Old City and to issue identity cards and 
passports. Whereas the urban space under the Ottomans was divided 
according to a mixed class–religion character, under the British the city 
became largely divided according to religious identities. Th e segregation 
model that developed upon the arrival of the British reduced social in-
teraction and contributed to creating the idea of an inevitable confl ict 
between communities.
Th e street names chosen were clearly linked with the history of Jeru-
salem, but none of them really symbolized the unity of the city; on the 
contrary, they suggested a clear religious cleavage of the city and failed 
to promote a sense of unity based on common citizenship – something 
the Ottomans had, to an extent, been able to promote in the last decade 
of their rule. Late Ottoman urban planning was driven by discourses of 
modernity through public works such as transportation, electric lighting 
and civic buildings – like the clock tower that for two decades domi-
nated the skyline of Jerusalem before Storrs had it demolished for being 
ugly and not in line with the ancient walls.29
Th e British, through the agency of Ronald Storrs, set in motion a so-
cial and spatial process that aimed at the division and homogenization of 
the Old City and the city outside the walls according to religion; it may 
be defi ned as confessionalization or segregation. Th e British, whether 
aware or not, contributed to the development of exclusive and ‘asyn-
cretic’ religious identities, which made religion a key feature of Pales-
tinian nationalism and favoured Zionism as an example of full secular 
nationalism. Salim Tamari has noted that this proved to be a retrogres-
sion from the Ottoman system.30 Social interaction between commu-
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nities was very common and not at all an empty cohabitation; it was 
based more on neighbourhood coexistence, as proved by the diaries and 
memoirs of local residents like Wasif Jawhariyya, Isman Turjman and 
Gad Frumkin and also of Western residents.31 Jawhariyya noted in his 
memoirs, ‘During the Ottoman rule we, the sons of Jerusalem of our 
diff erent denominations, lived like a family, with no diff erence between 
a Muslim and a Christian’.32 British policies, such as the aforementioned 
confessionalization of the Old City, which eventually ended with the di-
vision of the Old City into four communities – along with street naming, 
the demolition of the Ottoman clock tower, the regulation of buildings 
(colour and shape of the stones), the regulation of businesses inside/out-
side the Old City and the regulation of public transportation – catalysed 
the shift from communalism characterized by shared spaces to national-
ism based on ethnic and religious identity characterized by the absence 
of shared space. However, it would not be fair to attribute to the British 
alone the structural changes that occurred in the city. Nationalism as an 
ideology, already fostered by the Ottomans, played a major role; the war 
and British support for Zionism through the Balfour Declaration also 
proved to be a strong impetus to nationalist mobilization. Th en, quoting 
Tamari, ‘all of a sudden, a Jew [including any local Jew] in Arab Pales-
tinian eyes became the European, the intruder from a diff erent ethnic 
community which was contesting ownership of the land’ in Jerusalem 
and in Palestine.33 Th e shift was indeed gradual and cumulative through 
the 1920s; however, I would argue that the Nebi Musa riots were the fi rst 
major sign of a changing pattern that introduced violence as a political 
tool, and the fi rst test of national struggle.
Th e Riots
Surprisingly, the Nebi Musa riots have not attracted much academic 
attention. Historians have regarded these events as being of secondary 
importance, mostly overshadowed by clashes between Arabs and Zion-
ists like the Wailing Wall riots of 1929, or the revolts from 1936 to 1939. 
I suspect this lack of attention is due to the very fact that the British 
defi ned them as ‘riots’, a defi nition that involved a political judgement. 
Often, authorities label as riots events that are considered detrimen-
tal to public order and driven by supposedly ‘irrational’ mobs.34 While 
riots are generally associated with spontaneous eruptions of violence, 
this is not always the case. Often, riots are meticulously planned and 
collectively executed actions of contention, as was indeed the case in 
the Nebi Musa riots.35 I believe many scholars in search of the origin of 
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the Arab–Israeli confl ict have simply overlooked this event, labelling it 
as an example of communal violence. However, this was not the case 
at the end of the First World War. I would argue that at this stage the 
dispute was far from being a ‘simple’ communal issue, as it was clearly 
over projects, ideas and perceived threats that crossed the boundaries 
of communalism. Th e escalation from communal hostility to structured 
and politicized violence was becoming visible but not at all inevitable. 
However, I would argue, the presence of a less than coherent and con-
sistent third party – the British – contributed to the polarization of the 
developing confl ict between emerging national-political movements. 
British policies also redesigned the borders of Jerusalemite society and 
space, with short-term plans such as forbidding Muslims to enter the 
Church of the Holy Sepulchre and with long-term projects like the im-
plementation of the Balfour Declaration. I would suggest that foreign 
intervention through occupation and the implementation of policies, or 
the threat thereof, is key to understanding the outbreak of the riots and 
more general confl icts in the city.
Nebi Musa was an Islamic religious festival that included processions 
from diff erent towns around Jerusalem leading into the city; Muslims 
celebrated the prophet Moses during the same period as the Christian 
Orthodox Easter and the Jewish Passover. Th e central celebration was 
the long pilgrimage from the traditional burial site of Moses, near Jer-
icho, along the road to Jerusalem.36 Th e celebrations had the power to 
create a bond between people from various parts of Palestine who gath-
ered in a single place for the festival. Indeed, in 1920, the leaders of the 
Arab political parties and associations exploited the excitement and en-
thusiasm aroused by the festival to make sure their voices were heard 
by both the Zionists and the British. On the other hand, Zionists, par-
ticularly those led by the revisionist Vladimir Jabotinsky, who proposed 
a more aggressive approach towards local Arabs, worked to heat up the 
atmosphere, already far from idyllic.
To show how a degree of structured violence was introduced and 
how the paradigm shift mentioned earlier took place, let us focus on the 
events that occurred at the beginning of April 1920. On Friday, 2 April, 
the fi rst ceremony of the Nebi Musa festival passed without incident, 
and it seems that the small police force dealing with the procession was 
successful. Sunday, 4 April, was the day of the main pilgrimage from the 
shrine of the prophet Moses near Jericho to Jerusalem. Ordinarily, the 
route followed by pilgrims upon their arrival in Jerusalem included a 
walk along Jaff a Road. Th ey then entered the Old City through Damas-
cus Gate and from there reached the Haram al-Sharif. On this day, the 
procession stopped outside the Old City on Jaff a Road, just opposite the 
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Jaff a Gate. Notables and religious leaders, including a very heated group 
coming from Hebron carrying the Hebron banner, then started to de-
liver infl ammatory political speeches, contrary to the usual protocol.37 
Th e choice of Jaff a Gate, I would argue, was not accidental. Th e gate 
represented one of the most important access points in the city, was 
not affi  liated with any religious groups and was a symbol of modernity, 
as it was the seat of the Ottoman clock tower built in 1907 and later 
demolished by the British. Aref al-Aref, the editor of the popular nation-
alist newspaper al-Suriyya al-Janubiyya (Th e Southern Syria), published 
since 1919, declared, ‘If we don’t use force against the Jews, we will never 
be rid of them’. In response, the crowd chanted Nashrab dam al-yahud 
(We will drink the blood of the Jews). Khalil Baydas, also known as Raʾid 
al-qissa al-fi lastiniyya (the pioneer of Palestinian history), concluded 
his speech by saying, ‘My voice is weakening with emotion, but my na-
tional heart will never weaken’. From a balcony, Musa Kazim al-Husayni, 
the mayor of Jerusalem, also spoke. After his speech, the crowd roared, 
‘Palestine is our land, the Jews are our dogs!’ Pictures of Faysal were also 
displayed, and he was acclaimed as King of Syria and Palestine. A young 
al-Hajj Amin cried aloud: ‘O Arabs! Th is is your King!’38 Th is rhetoric 
polarized the situation, opening more avenues for open violent confl ict 
and, as Charles Tilly stated, ‘widening the political and social space be-
tween claimants’.39
While the fi rst half of the procession was passing through the Jaff a 
Gate, the riot began between Christaki’s pharmacy and the Credit Lyon-
nais. Available sources do not clarify the exact trigger, and it is arguable 
that more than one event functioned as a catalyst.40 In the vicinity of the 
Arab rally, some Zionists were listening to the speeches. It is likely some 
belonged to the self-defence force organized by Vladimir Jabotinsky, by 
this time already enlisting six hundred troops performing military drills 
on a daily basis.41 Already in early March, Jabotinsky was working to in-
fl ame the atmosphere, and he began to publicly predict a pogrom. Some 
evidence suggests that these Jewish spectators were quite provocative. 
Allegedly, a Jew pushed an Arab carrying a nationalist fl ag, and he tried 
to spit on the banner and on the Arab crowd.42 According to testimony 
gathered by the French consul, some young Jews standing near Jaff a Gate 
attacked some Arabs after the speech delivered by Muhammed Darwish 
of the Arab Club (one of the Christian–Muslim associations).43 All of 
these reports suggest only Jewish provocation; however, it is possible, 
though unreported, that Arab activities also triggered the riots.
Shops inside the Old City were looted after they had been the targets 
of a volley of stones, and spectators close to the New Grand Hotel were 
beaten with stones. Th e crowd then moved down towards the centre 
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of the Old City, where some Jewish shops were looted and several Jews 
were assaulted. Some of the Jews involved carried weapons, as in the 
case of two who fi red from a house overlooking the procession route. 
Both were shot by the British-Indian police deployed by Ronald Storrs. 
Th e incident started at 10.00 a.m. and was practically over by midday. 
Th e night was quiet, and the pilgrims from Hebron, who were confi ned 
for the night in the police barracks, were taken to the Haram al-Sharif 
and from there escorted to St Stephen’s Gate on their way to Nebi Musa. 
Disorder, however, broke out again early in the morning and lasted until 
3.00 p.m., when martial law was declared following some cases of violent 
assault and looting. Th e following day, looting and violence continued, 
albeit on a smaller scale, although two cases of rape against Jewish girls 
were reported close to the Arab market near New Street; the police shot 
into an Arab mob to reach the house where the rape allegedly occurred. 
Although martial law was declared, looting was still carried out; in fact, 
it seems the police were not able to cope with the intricacy of the streets 
of the Old City – a labyrinth. By Friday, 9 April, the situation had slowly 
been brought under control, and only occasional incidents were still be-
ing reported. Th e reported casualties amounted to 251, of whom nine 
Jews and twenty-two Arabs were critically wounded. Five Jews and four 
Muslims had been killed; 211 Jews were reported wounded, as opposed 
to twenty-one Muslims and three Christians. Seven British soldiers were 
also injured; however, it appears that the police were never the target of 
the attackers, whether Arabs or Jews.44
Storrs seems to have ignored early warnings of impending troubles 
issued in the reports available in late April and in the Commission of 
Inquiry established by high commissioner of Egypt and command-
er-in-chief, Allenby. Zionists accused the local police force of being in-
adequate and mainly Arab in character. On Friday 2 April, the day before 
the outbreak, the ceremony had passed without incident; this led Storrs 
to think or at least to claim that the small, local police force could cope 
with the main procession. After the fi rst day of riots, Storrs decided to 
withdraw the main bulk of the troops from the Old City, in order to 
enable business to proceed as usual. Storrs believed that showing nor-
mality restored could prevent the outbreak of further violence.45 In brief, 
the military apparatus allowed the demonstrations to take place, and it 
adopted a ‘wait and see’ policy. Only when incidents became evident 
and events unstoppable did the military intervene to stop the violence.46
Th e riots had a visible impact on Jerusalem. Th e stage was now set 
for an open tripartite political battle among British, Arabs and Zionists; 
yet, this does not mean that escalation in the degree of hostility between 
these actors was inevitable. Th e British saw the riots as an expression of 
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political and racial tensions, and did not consider these events an organ-
ized attempt to introduce violence as a political language in Jerusalem 
and Palestine. However, in my view, communal clashes were now super-
seded by structured violence, or at least by the threat of it. As perform-
ers of violence, both sides, Arabs and Zionists, realized that in this new 
context tactical pre-emption was vital, yet not to be deployed immedi-
ately because of the presence of the British, and in the case of the Zion-
ists because of their demographic disadvantage. Th e riots were a bitter 
clash. Th ey were politically motivated, but were not yet evidence of an 
open confl ict. In other words, in April 1920, local values and alliances 
were renegotiated but not radicalized.47 Th e confessionalization of space 
implemented by British policies played an important part in fostering 
the emergence of organized violence. From a space for the development 
of citizenship, Jerusalem had been transformed into a sacred space.
Conclusion
Th is chapter has shown how and why structured violence emerged in 
Jerusalem during the transitional era from Ottoman to British rule. Th e 
Nebi Musa riots that broke out in April 1920 epitomized a major change 
in urban and national politics, and were instrumental to the introduc-
tion of organized violence as a means of reaching political goals. Rela-
tionships between Zionists and Arabs were not inherently violent; in 
fact, violence was still an option rather than the normality. With the 
creation of political organizations on both sides – the Zionists with the 
Zionist Commission, later to become the Jewish Agency, and the for-
mation of Muslim–Christian associations and later Arab societies – and 
the absence of political institutions, violence became a tool for political 
communication. Th is chapter has tried to answer an important question 
about the nature of this violence. Did the Nebi Musa riots introduce 
violence as a means to an end, or rather as an end in itself? Th e latter 
would certainly be a frightening conclusion. As shown, the introduction 
of violence in a more organized and sophisticated way was the outcome 
of a variety of factors: the British creation of a fertile framework; and a 
choice, certainly not well pondered in the long term, by the Zionist and 
Arab organizations.
Th is chapter has also highlighted how the urban policies implemented 
by the British contributed to a shift in the local urban alliances and in 
the relationship between communal identities and space. In the late Ot-
toman era, relations between communities were marked by a degree of 
coexistence that included shared religious and civic spaces. Th e Nebi 
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Musa riots marked the end of this state of aff airs, opening a new chapter 
in the history of Jerusalem and of Palestine. For those who depict the 
Palestinian–Israeli confl ict as something that goes back to time imme-
morial and regard violence as something naturally implanted in both 
communities, the study of the Nebi Musa riots shows the exact opposite. 
Collective organized violence was relatively unknown and little experi-
mented with in Jerusalem; relationships between communities, though 
not always idyllic, were not continuously strained, and it is only with the 
introduction of political discourses over land control that relations be-
tween communities, gradually in time and radically in nature, changed. 
Th ese riots were a fi rst step in this direction.
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